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Abstract
Motivated by the application of designing fair and efficient school choice lotteries,
we consider constrained efficiency notions for random assignments under priorities.
We provide a constrained (priority respecting) version of the ordinal efficiency welfare
theorem for random assignments. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a
cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold.
JEL-classification: C78, D47
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1 Introduction
The assignment of students to schools (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 2003) is one of the
major applications of matching theory. A school choice mechanism assigns students to
schools taking into account the preferences of students and priorities of the students at
the different schools. Thick priorities are a generic problem in school choice. In practice,
students are prioritized according to very coarse criteria (based e.g. on proximity, or
having a sibling in the school) such that many students have the same priority for a seat
at a school. Thus, one can sometimes not avoid to treat students differently ex-post
even though they have the same priorities and preferences. However, ex-ante, some
form of fairness can be restored by the use of lotteries. This has motivated researchers
to study the problem of designing fair school choice lotteries.
A minimal ex-ante fairness requirement for random assignments under priorities is
that the lottery should respect the priorities. One way of formalizing this requirement
is the following: A student i has ex-ante justified envy if there is a school s where
∗The author thanks Pe´ter Biro´, Battal Dogˇan, Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, Jordi Masso´, Panos Protopapas,
Marek Pycia and participants of the Sixth World Congress of the Game Theory Society for interesting
discussions and comments on a previous version of the paper. The author is particularly grateful to Antonio
Miralles for pointing out the connection of the results to the ordinal welfare theorems of McLennan and of
Manea. Financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) under project 100018-150086
is gratefully acknowledged.
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a lower priority student j has a positive probability of receiving a seat and i would
rather have a seat in s than at some other school at which he has a positive probability
of receiving a seat. In this case, it would be natural to eliminate the justified envy,
i.e. changing the probability shares such that i has a higher chance of receiving a seat
at school s at the expense of the lower ranked student j. Ex-ante stability requires
that there is no ex-ante justified envy.
Respecting priorities, usually leads to efficiency losses (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez,
2003). Naturally, this motivates the question under which conditions efficiency can be
reached in a constrained, i.e. priority respecting, way. Our paper contributes to this
discussion. We formulate new notions of constrained efficiency properties for random
allocations. The notions are motivated by the observation that there can be two sources
of efficiency losses in the context of allocating under thick priorities. The first source
is the direct effect of choosing higher or lower admission thresholds at the different
schools: Already in the context of deterministic assignments with strict priorities, there
can be multiple priority respecting assignments that are distinguished by which priority
ranks are sufficient to be admitted at a school. By reallocating seat from higher to lower
priority applicants, one obtains a priority-respecting assignment that is better from the
point of view of applicants. The second source of efficiency loss is a pure mis-allocation
effect that can only happen if priority classes are thick. In this case, it can happen
that a priority-respecting assignment can be made more efficient just be reallocating
(probabilities of obtaining) seats among equal priority applicants without admitting
more lower priority student at any school. We focus on the second kind of efficiency
losses and call an assignment constrained efficient if is not dominated (in efficiency
terms) by a random assignment that does not use a “more lenient” admission policy at
any school. Formulating constrained efficiency in this way, lets us clearly distinguish
between the effect of harder or softer admission policies and the welfare gains through
reallocating school seats within priority classes.
Our main result is a constrained ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for priority
respecting lotteries under our constrained efficiency notion. We also consider cardinal
welfare theorems (for the difference between cardinal and ordinal welfare theorems see
the discussion below) and show by means of a counter example that a cardinal second
welfare cannot be established for our constrained efficiency notion in the context of the
pseudo markets of He et al. (2017).
1.1 Related Literature
The literature on priority respecting lotteries has been motivated by the application of
designing school choice mechanisms. In the school choice set-up, ex-ante stability has
been introduced by Kesten and U¨nver (2015). For the classical marriage model the
condition was first considered by Roth et al. (1993). Kesten and U¨nver (2015) consider
mechanisms that implement ex-ante stable assignments and satisfy constrained ordinal
efficiency properties. He et al. (2017) define an appealing class of mechanisms that
implement ex-ante stable lotteries. These mechanisms generalize the pseudo-market
mechanisms of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) by allowing for priority-specific pricing
(agents with different priorities are offered different prices).
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Welfare theorems have been studied in the context of random assignments without
priorities. It is important here, to distinguish between ordinal efficiency welfare theo-
rems and cardinal welfare theorems. An ordinal efficiency welfare theorem establishes
that ordinal efficiency (in the sense of first order stochastic dominance) for a random
assignment is equivalent to the existence of a cardinal utility profile consistent with the
ordinal preferences under which the random assignment is Pareto efficient when lotter-
ies are evaluated according to expected utility. Pareto efficiency can be strengthened
to social welfare efficiency. The original ordinal welfare is due to McLennan (2002). A
constructive proof was later provided by Manea (2008). In this paper we generalize the
ordinal efficiency welfare theorem to the case of random assignments with priorities.
Cardinal welfare theorems for random assignments are counterparts to the classical
welfare theorems for exchange economies. For cardinal welfare theorems, utility profiles
are the primitive of the model. In this context, a classical mechanism due to Hylland
and Zeckhauser (1979) uses a pseudo market in probability shares to randomly allo-
cate objects. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) show that the equilibria of their pseudo
markets are Pareto efficient and hence establish a cardinal first welfare theorem. In
a recent contribution, Miralles and Pycia (2014) establish a cardinal second welfare
theorem that demonstrates that each Pareto efficient random allocation can be decen-
tralized as a pseudo-market equilibrium by appropriately choosing budgets and prices.
The main technical difficulty in their proof, in comparison to the classical welfare the-
orems for exchange economies, is that in the context of lotteries one necessarily deals
with satiated preferences (since probabilities have to add up to 1, respectively since
each applicants receives at most one school seat). We show that the result does not
generalize to the markets with priority-specific pricing of He et al. (2017).
2 Model and Preliminary Results
2.1 Model
There is a set of n agents N and a set of m schools M . A generic agent is denoted by
i and a generic school by j. In each school j, there is a finite number of seats qj ∈ N.
We assume that there are as many school seats as agents,
∑
j∈M qj = n.
1 A lottery
over schools is a probability distribution over M .
Agents have preferences over lotteries over schools. Preferences of agents can be
modeled in two different ways: In the first version, each agent i has strict preferences
Pi over different schools. We call P = (Pi)i∈N a preference profile. We write
j Ri j
′ if j Pi j′ or j = j′. The preferences can be extended to a partial preference
order over lotteries using the stochastic dominance criterion: A lottery pi′ first-order
stochastically dominates lottery pi with respect to preferences Pi, if for each j ∈M
we have ∑
j′∈M :j′Ri j
pi′j′ ≥
∑
j′∈M :j′Ri j
pij′
1Our results can be generalized to the case where the number of school seats and agents differ by adding
dummy agents and schools. See Aziz and Klaus (2017), for the details of this construction.
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and the inequality is strict for at least one school j. We write pi′ PSDi pi if pi
′ first order
stochastically dominates pi according to Pi and pi
′RSDi pi if either pi
′ PSDi pi or pi = pi
′.
In the second version, each agent i has a von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM)
utility vector Ui = (uij)j∈M ∈ RM+ . We call U = (Ui)i∈N a utility profile. We
assume that utilities are strict, i.e. for j 6= j′ we have uij 6= uij′ . Lotteries are evaluated
according to expected utility. Thus agent i prefers lottery pi′ to lottery pi if∑
j∈M
uij · pi′j >
∑
j∈M
uij · pij .
A utility vector contains more information than a preference relation. In addition to
ranking the schools, the vNM-utilities express the rates with which agents substitute
probabilities of obtaining seats at the different school. Utility vector Ui is consistent
with preferences Pi, if for each pair of schools j, j
′ ∈ M we have jPij′ ⇔ uij > uij′ .
Each utility vector Ui is consistent with one preference relation Pi that we call the
preference relation induced by Ui. It is a standard result (see e.g. Proposition 6.D.1
in Mas-Colell et al., 1995), that if lottery pi′ first order stochastically dominates lottery
pi according to preferences Pi, then lottery pi
′ yields higher expected utility than pi
according to any vNM-utilities Ui consistent with Pi.
Each school j has a weak (reflexive, complete and transitive) priority order j of
the agents. We let i ∼j i′ if and only if i j i′ and i′ j i. We let i j i′ if and only
if i j i′ but not i′ j i. The priorities j of a school j partition N in equivalence
classes of equal priority agents, i.e. in equivalence classes with respect to ∼j . We call
these equivalence classes priority classes and denote them by N1j , N
2
j . . . , N
`j
j with
indices increasing with priority. Thus for a > b, i ∈ Naj and i′ ∈ N bj we have i j i′.
We use the notation i j Nkj to indicate that i has higher priority at j than the agents
in the priority class Nkj .
2.2 Allocations, ex-ante stability, cut-offs and admission
policies
A deterministic assignment is a mapping µ : N → M such that for each j ∈ M
we have |µ−1(j)| = qj . A random assignment is a probability distribution over
deterministic assignments. By the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem, each random as-
signment corresponds to a bi-stochastic matrix and, vice versa, each such matrix cor-
responds to a random assignment (see Kojima and Manea (2010) for a proof in the
set-up that we consider). Thus each random assignment is represented by a matrix
(xij) ∈ RN×M such that
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1,
∑
j∈M
xij = 1,
∑
i∈N
xij = qj ,
where xij is the probability that agent i is matched to an object of type j. We write
xi = (xij)j∈M . The vector xi is a lottery over M .
A random assignment represented by the matrix (xij) is ex-ante blocked for
preference profile P and priorities  by agent i and school j if there is some agent
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i′ 6= i with xi′j > 0 and i j i′ and some school j′ with xij′ > 0 and j Pi j′. In this
case we say that i has justified envy at school j. A random assignment is ex-ante
stable or ex-ante priority-respecting if it is not blocked by any agent-school pair.2
The definition extends to the case where agents have VNM-utilities, by considering the
preference profile induced by the utility profile.
We define the cut-off Cj(x) for a school j under assignment x to be the lowest
priority class containing an agent that has a positive probability of obtaining a set in
school j in x. Formally
Cj(x) := N
min{`:∃i∈N`j ,xi,j>0}
j .
Ex-ante stable assignments can be interpreted as lotteries that ration seats in the cut-
offs: An agent is assigned with positive probability to (some) of the schools for which
is in the cut-off, with the remaining probability allocated to his most preferred school
for which he is above the cut-off. This school can be interpreted as the agent’s “safe
school” where he gets a seat if he does not get a more-preferred seat in one of the
school where he is in the cut-off. A school may have different cut-offs in different ex-
ante stable lotteries or it may use the same cut-offs but admit a smaller fraction of
agents in the cut-off. We say that school j uses a strictly more lenient admission
policy under assignment y than under assignment x, if either the school has a strictly
lower cut-off in y than in x or it has the same cut-off, but admits a bigger fraction of
the students in the cut-off class. Formally
Cj(x) j Cj(y) or [Cj(x) = Cj(y) and
∑
i∈Cj(x)=Cj(x)
yij >
∑
i∈Cj(x)=Cj(x)
xij ].
Example 1. Consider five agents, five schools, each with a single seat (qj = 1 for each
j), and the following preferences and priorities.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 2 5 1, 2, 3 5 1, 3, 5 4, 3, 5 1
4 2 2 5 3 4, 5 1 2, 4 1, 2 2
5 5 3 4 2 2, 3, 4 3
2 3 5 3 1 4, 5
3 4 4 1 4
The underlined entries in the priority table correspond to the cut-offs under the follow-
ing two assignments (rows correspond to agents, columns to schools; schools j1, . . . , j4
have the same cut-off under both assignments, school j5 has a higher cut-off under y
than under x):
x =

1
3 0 0
1
2
1
6
1
3
1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
6
1
3 0
1
6
0 13 0
1
2
1
6
0 16
2
3 0
1
6
 , y =

1
3 0 0
1
4
7
12
1
3
1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
6
1
4 0
1
4
0 14 0
3
4 0
0 14
3
4 0 0

2For deterministic assignments, ex-ante stability is equivalent to the usual notion of a stable matching.
In particular, ex-ante stable assignments always exists, since stable matchings always exist.
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Going through all potential blocking pairs, one can check that both x and y are ex-ante
stable. We compare x and y in terms of admission policies. School j1 uses the same
admission policy in assignments x and y as∑
i∈Cj1 (x)
yij1 =
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
3 = 1 =
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
3 =
∑
i∈Cj1 (x)
yij1 .
School j2 uses a more lenient admission policy in x than in y, since the cut-off at j2 is
the same in both assignments, but j2 admits a bigger fraction of the students in the
cut-off class ∑
i∈Cj2 (x)
xij2 =
1
3 +
1
6 +
1
3 =
5
6 >
3
4 =
1
3 +
1
6 +
1
4 =
∑
i∈Cj2 (x)
yij2 .
School j3 uses the same admission policy in assignments x and y as∑
i∈Cj3 (x)
yij3 =
1
3 +
2
3 = 1 =
1
4 +
3
4 =
∑
i∈Cj3 (x)
yij3 .
School j4 uses a more lenient admission policy in x than in y, since the cut-off at j4 is
the same in both assignments, but j4 admits a bigger fraction of the students in the
cut-off class ∑
i∈Cj4 (x)
xij4 =
1
2 >
1
4 =
∑
i∈Cj4 (x)
yij4 .
School j5 uses a more lenient admission policy in x than in y, since the cut-off at j5
under x is lower in x than y.
2.3 Constrained Efficiency
The notion of a more lenient admission policy allows us to define constrained efficiency
notions by requiring that an allocation is un-dominated among allocations that do not
use a more lenient admission policy at any school. We define three different notions
of constrained efficiency based on three different and well-known dominance relations.
The first notion is defined for ordinal preferences. A lottery y first order stochas-
tically dominates (SD-dominates) x if for each i ∈ N we have yiRSDi xi and for at
least one agent we have yi P
SD
i xi. Lottery x is constrained ordinally efficient if for
each lottery y that SD-dominates x there is a school that uses a more lenient admission
policy under y than under x.
The other two efficiency notions are defined for cardinal preferences. A lottery y
Pareto dominates lottery x with respect to VNM utility profile U if for each i ∈ N
we have ∑
j∈M
uij · yij ≥
∑
j∈M
uij · xij ,
and the inequality is strict for at least one agent. A lottery x is constrained Pareto
efficient with respect to U if for each lottery y that Pareto-dominates x with respect
to U there is a school that uses a more lenient admission policy under y than under x.
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A lottery y dominates lottery x in social welfare terms with respect to VNM
utility profile U if ∑
i,j
uij · yij >
∑
i,j
uij · xij .
A lottery x is constrained social welfare efficient if for each lottery y that dom-
inates x in social welfare terms with respect to U there is a school that uses a more
lenient admission policy under y than under x.
The efficiency notions have been introduced in increasing order of strength. The
following proposition summarizes this fact. The proof is easy and follows along well-
known arguments.
Proposition 1. Let U be a VNM-utility profile, P the ordinal preference profile induced
by U , let  be a priority profile and x a random assignment.
1. If x is constrained social welfare efficient with respect to U and , then it is
constrained Pareto efficient with respect to U and .
2. If x is constrained Pareto efficient with respect to U and , then x is constrained
ordinally efficient with respect to P and .
Proof. For the first part, suppose for the sake of contradiction that x is constrained
social welfare efficient but Pareto dominated by a lottery y that does not use a more
lenient admission policy at any school. By the definition of Pareto dominance, we have
for each i ∈ N that ∑
j∈M
uij · yij ≥
∑
j∈M
uij · xij ,
where the inequality is strict for at least one agent. Summing up the inequalities for
different agents we obtain:∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
uij · yij >
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
uij · xij .
But this contradict the assumption that x is social welfare maximizing among lotteries
that do not use a more lenient admission policy at any school than lottery x.
For the second part, suppose for the sake of contradiction that x is constrained
Pareto efficient but first order stochastically dominated by a lottery y that does not
use a more lenient admission policy at any school. As noted in Section 2, if for i we
have yi P
SD
i xi then, as Ui is consistent with Pi
∑
j∈M uij · yij >
∑
j∈M uij · xij . Thus
if y first order stochastically dominates x, for each i ∈ N we have∑
j∈M
uij · yij ≥
∑
j∈M
uij · xij ,
where the inequality is strict for at least one agent. But this contradict the assumption
that x is Pareto optimal among lotteries that do not use a more lenient admission
policy at any school than lottery x.
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2.3.1 Constrained ordinal efficiency and strong stable improvement
cycles
If a priority-respecting random assignment is not constrained ordinally efficiency, then
one can generate a more efficient and priority-respecting random assignment by reallo-
cating probability shares between agents of equal priority or by reallocating probability
shares from higher to lower priority agents. It turns out that it is sufficient to look at
the reallocation of probability shares within priority classes. Moreover, it is sufficient
to look at efficiency improvements through pairwise trade within priority classes. This
leads us to the notion of a strong stable improvement cycle that we will introduce next.
We will later prove that the absence of these kind of cycles is equivalent to constrained
ordinal efficiency. A strong (ex-ante) stable improvement cycle for an ex-ante
stable assignment x is a sequence of agents i1, i2, . . . , ik and schools j1, j2, . . . , jk such
that for each 1 ≤ ` ≤ k (taking indices modulo k) the following holds:
1. xi`,j` > 0
2. Agent i` prefers j`+1 to j`.
3. Agents i` and i`−1 have the same priority at j`. 3
Strong stable improvement cycles can be used to increase ex-ante efficiency without
violating ex-ante stability, by reallocating probability shares through pairwise trade
within priority classes. This can be achieved by transferring probability shares in j1
from i2 to i1, probability shares in j2 from i3 to i2, and so on. Changing probability
shares in this way will not change the shares of school seats allocated to the different
indifference classes. It only reallocates shares within priority classes. Each ex-ante
stable random assignment can be transformed into a constrained ordinally efficient ex-
ante stable random assignment, by successively reallocating probability shares along a
strong stable improvement cycles, until no such cycle is left.
Example 2. Consider a market with two agents and two schools with one seat each.
Both agents have the same priority at both schools and agent rank the schools in
opposite order:
P1 P2 1 2
2 1 1, 2 1, 2
1 2
Consider the assignment: (
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
3Usually a weaker notion of a stable improvement cycle is considered that has originally been defined for
deterministic stable matchings (Erdil and Ergin, 2008) and generalized to the probabilistic set-up by Kesten
and U¨nver (2015). In comparison to a strong stable improvement cycles, in the definition of a (weak) stable
improvement cycle the third item in the definition is replaced by the weaker condition that i` is one of the
highest priority agents at school j`+1 that prefers j`+ to some of the object types that he is matched to under
Π. Strong improvement cycles are the most obvious sources for an ex-ante, stability-preserving efficiency
gain, in the sense that their resolution only reallocates probability shares within priority classes, whereas
other stable improvement cycles might redistribute probability shares across priority classes.
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Since both agents have the same priority at both schools, the assignment is ex-ante
stable. The assignment has however a strong stable improvement cycle consisting of
agents 1 and 2 and schools 1 and 2. Reallocating probability shares for school 1 from
1 to 2 and reallocating probability shares for school 2 from 2 to 1, would lead to an
efficiency gain.
A consequence of the absence of strong stable improvement cycles is that it allows us
to order schools in a way that reflects a common component of the agents’ preferences.
The following lemma describes the ordering and will be crucial in much of the following
discussion.
Lemma 2. Let x be an ex-ante stable random assignment with respect to P and .
If x has no strong stable improvement cycle with respect to P and , then there is
an ordering B of the schools such that the following holds: If i ∈ Cj(x) ∩ Cj′(x) and
xij > 0 then
j′ B j ⇒ j′ Pi j.
Proof. The lemma is a consequence of the combinatorial result that directed graphs
are acyclic if and only if they can be topologically ordered. This means that vertices
can be ordered such that if there is an arc from vertex v to u then u comes before v in
the ordering.4 To apply this result to our context, we construct a directed graph G(x)
on the vertex set consisting of all schools V (G(x)) = M and draw a directed edge from
j to j′ if and only if there is an agent i with xij > 0 who prefers j′ to j, i.e. j′ Pi j.
The absence of a strong stable improvement cycle then implies that the graph G(x) is
acyclic. Thus we can topologically order the graph G(x). The ordering is the desired
ordering of schools (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
3 Results
3.1 Pseudo-Market Mechanisms
In this section, we consider the pseudo-markets with priority-specific pricing of He et al.
(2017). A random assignment is generated by a pseudo-market of probability shares.
Each agent has a budget of tokens and can “buy” probability shares at the different
object types. Agents face different prices depending on their priority. More precisely,
for each object type there is a cut-off priority class.5 All agents ranked below the
cut-off of an object type cannot buy shares at the object type, i.e. they face an infinite
price, all agents in the cut-off class face the same finite price and all agents ranked
above the cut-off class can get shares at the object type for free. By construction,
the mechanisms always implement an ex-ante stable random assignment. Moreover a
first welfare theorem holds and pseudo-market equilibrium assignments are constrained
Pareto efficient (Theorem 5 in He et al., 2017).6
4See e.g. West (2001) for a proof that acyclicity is equivalent to the existence of a topological ordering.
5The cut-offs can always be chosen such that in equilibrium they correspond to the cut-offs, as defined
in Section 2.2, of the equilibrium assignment. Thus we denote both concepts by the same name.
6He et al. (2017) use a slightly different efficiency notion that however is equivalent for ex-ante stable
assignments: They require that an assignment is not Pareto dominated by any assignment which also first
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
1
3 0 0
1
2
1
6
1
3
1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
6
1
3 0
1
6
0 13 0
1
2
1
6
0 16
2
3 0
1
6

C1(x)
C2(x)
C4(x)
C3(x)
C5(x)
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 1: We consider the priorities and preferences from Example 1 and the assignment
x. The graph on the right represents the preference information as follows: An arc is drawn
from the column corresponding to school j to the column corresponding to school j′ in the
row corresponding to agent i if i is in the cut-off for both j and j′, if xij > 0 and i prefers j′
to j. For example, agent i3 is in the cut-off for schools j1 and j2 and is assigned with positive
probability to j2. Moreover, agent i2 prefers j1 to j2. Therefore we draw an arc from j2 to j1.
Arcs implied by transitivity are not represented in the picture. A topological of the schools
is j1 B j4 B j2 B j5 B j3. Another such ordering is j1 B j2 B j4 B j5 B j3.
Formally, a pseudo-market of He et al. (2017) is a triple (U, b,) consisting of a
VNM-utility profile U , priorities  and a vector of budgets b ∈ RM+ . A constrained
equilibrium for the pseudo market (U, b,) is a triple (x,C, p) consisting of a random
assignment x, priority classes according to  for the different schools C = (Cj)j∈M
called the priority cut-offs, and cut-off prices p = (pj)j∈M ∈ RM+ such that the following
holds: Defining for each i ∈ N a price vector pi = (pij)j∈M ∈ RM+ where
pij =

∞, if Cj j i,
pj , if i ∼j Cj ,
0, if i j Cj .
(1)
for each i ∈ N the random assignment x is an optimum for the problem
max
pi∈RM
∑
j∈M
uij · pij
subject to
∑
j∈M
pij · pij ≤ bi∑
j∈M
pij ≤ 1
pij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈M.
order stochastically dominates the other assignment with respect to school priorities.
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Equivalently we can formulate the maximization problem as follows:
max
pi∈RM
∑
j:ijCj
uij · pij
subject to
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · pij ≤ bi∑
j:ijCj
pij ≤ 1
pij ≥ 0 ∀j : i j Cj .
It can be shown (He et al., 2017) that for each market (U, b,) there exists a constrained
equilibrium. We denote the set of constrained equilibria for (U, b,) by E(U, b,). By
construction, each equilibrium assignment is an ex-ante stable random assignment.
Proposition 3 (He et al., 2017). For each utility profile, budget vector and priorities
, each constrained equilibrium assignment is ex-ante stable with respect to the induced
preference profile.
Proof. Let (x,C, p) ∈ E(U, b,). Suppose x is ex-ante blocked by i and j. Then i j Cj
and therefore pij = 0. Moreover, there is a j
′ with j Pi j′ and xij′ > 0. Thus i would
obtain a higher expected utility by obtaining shares in j which i can get for free rather
than shares in j′. We have a contradiction.
We show that constrained equilibrium assignments are constrained Pareto efficient.
The argument is very similar to the standard argument that establishes the first welfare
theorem in exchange economies. The proposition is a reformulation of a theorem by He
et al. (2017) with our constrained efficiency notion.
Proposition 4 (Constrained First Welfare Theorem, He et al., 2017). For each utility
profile U , budget vector b and priorities , each constrained equilibrium allocation is
constrained Pareto efficient with respect to U and .
Proof. Let (x,C, p) ∈ E(U, b,). Suppose y Pareto dominates x and does not use
a more lenient admission policy than x at any school. By the definition of Pareto
dominance, for each i ∈ N , ∑
j∈M
uij · yij ≥
∑
j∈M
uij · xij ,
where the inequality is strict for at least one agent. For an agent i, for which the
inequality is strict, we have by revealed preferences∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · yij > bi ≥
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · xij .
Next we show that for an agent i, for which equality holds, i.e.∑
j∈M
uij · yij =
∑
j∈M
uij · xij ,
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we have ∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · yij ≥
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · xij .
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · yij <
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · xij ≤ bi.
Since
∑
j∈M uij ·yij =
∑
j∈M uij ·xij , lottery yj is a solution to the utility maximization
problem. Let j¯ be the most preferred school with a finite price for agent i, i.e.
uij¯ = max{j:pij<∞}
uij .
We show that yi is a degenerate lottery that chooses j¯ for sure, yij¯ = 1. Indeed, suppose
not. Then there is a school j 6= j¯ with yij > 0. Since
∑
j:i∈Cj pj · yij < bi and uij¯ > uij
(utilities are strict), increasing probability shares in j¯ by a small positive amount and
proportionally decreasing probability shares in j would lead to another feasible lottery
pi′ with
∑
j∈M uij · pi′j >
∑
j∈M uij · yij and
∑
j:i∈Cj pj · pi′j ≤ bi contradicting the
observation that yi is a solution to the utility maximization problem. Thus yi is the
degenerate lottery that chooses the best school with finite price for agent i. But if this
lottery is affordable for i, then it is the unique solution to the utility maximization
problem. Thus xi = yi. But this contradicts the assumption that∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · yij <
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · xij .
We have established that for i ∈ N we have∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · yij ≥
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · xij ,
with strict inequality for at least one agent. Summing the inequalities over all agents,
we obtain ∑
i∈N
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · yij >
∑
i∈N
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · xij .
Rearranging the terms we obtain
∑
j∈M
pj ·
∑
i∈Cj
yij
 > ∑
j∈M
pj ·
∑
i∈Cj
xij
 .
This implies that there is an object type j such that pj > 0 and∑
i∈Cj
yij >
∑
i∈Cj
xij .
Since agents below the cut-off Cj face infinite prices, we have Cj(x) j Cj . Since y is
not more lenient than x at j, we have Cj(y) j Cj(x) j Cj . Since
∑
i∈Cj yij > 0, we
have in fact equality: Cj(y) = Cj(x) = Cj . But then, as
∑
i∈Cj yij >
∑
i∈Cj xij , j uses
a more lenient admission policy at y than at x, a contradiction.
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It is a natural question whether the constrained efficiency notion in Proposition 4
can be further strengthened. It particular, it seems to be natural to require only that
the constrained equilibrium assignment is un-dominated by any random assignment
that uses the same cut-offs but does not necessarily assign the same probability mass
to each cut-off. Formally, call an assignment x strongly constrained efficient if for
each y that Pareto-dominates x there is a school j such that Cj(x) j Cj(y). The
following example shows that constrained equilibrium assignments in general fail to
satisfy strong constrained efficiency:
Example 3. Consider four agents, four schools, each with a single seat (qj = 1 for each
j), and the following utilities and priorities.
U1 U2 U3 U4 1 2 3 4
4 2 2 4 2, 3 4 2, 3 1
3 3 3 1 1 2, 3 1, 4 4
2 4 4 2 4 1 2, 3
1 1 1 3
and budgets
b1 = 1, b2 = 7, , b3 = 7, b4 = 1.
The underlined entries in the priorities are cut-offs C such that with prices
p1 = 3, p2 = 6, p3 = 12, p4 = 3,
the assignment
x =

1
3 0 0
2
3
1
3
1
6
1
2 0
1
3
1
6
1
2 0
0 23 0
1
3

is a constrained equilibrium assignment, i.e. (x,C, p) ∈ E(U, b,). The assignment
fails to be strongly constrained efficient however, since it is dominated by the (ex-ante
stable) random assignment
y =

1 0 0 0
0 12
1
2 0
0 12
1
2 0
0 0 0 1
 ,
and we have Cj(y) = Cj(x) for each j ∈M.
3.2 The Constrained Ordinal Efficiency Welfare Theorem
In this section, we prove the main theorem of our paper.
Theorem 5 (Constrained Ordinal Efficiency Welfare Theorem). Let x be ex-ante stable
according to P and . The following statements are equivalent:
1. x has no strong stable improvement cycle with respect to P and ,
2. x is constrained ordinally efficient with respect to P and ,
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3. there exists a VNM-utility profile U consistent with P such that x is constrained
Pareto-efficient with respect to U and ,
4. there exists a VNM-utility profile U consistent with P , such that x is constrained
social welfare maximizing with respect to U and ,
5. there exists a VNM-utility profile U consistent with P , a budget vector b, prices
p and cut-offs C such that (x,C, p) ∈ E(U, b,).
The utility profile U can be chosen in the same way in (3),(4) and (5).
Proof. Let x be ex-ante stable. By Propositions 1, we have that (4) ⇒ (3) ⇒ (2). It
follows immediately from the definitions that (2) ⇒ (1). By Proposition 4, we have
(5) ⇒ (3). We will show that (1) ⇒ (4) and (1) ⇒ (5) which will complete the proof.
After the proof, we present an example that will illustrate the proof. The reader may
want to consult the example, as a running example during the proof.
Suppose x is constrained ordinally efficient. First we define the utility profile U
that will be the same in the proof that (1)⇒ (4) and in the proof that (1)⇒ (5). By
Lemma 2, there is an ordering B of the schools such that if an agent prefers a school j′
for which he is in the cut-off under x to another school j for which he is in the cut-off
and xij′ > 0 and j
′ B j, then i prefers j′ to j. We choose positive numbers (uj)j∈M
such that for each j, j′ ∈M we have
j′ B j ⇒ uj′ > uj .
We will define utilities in such way that for each school j all agents in the cut-off of j
under x that are matched to j with positive probability have the same utility uj for j.
Moreover, this utility will be the maximal utility that any agent who is in the cut-off
for j has for receiving a seat in j. Thus we require for each i and j that
xij > 0, i ∈ Cj(x)⇒ uij = uj , (2)
xij = 0, i ∈ Cj(x)⇒ uij ≤ uj . (3)
Furthermore we choose a number u¯ > 0 with u¯ < uj for each j ∈ M and require for
each agent i ∈ N that for schools for which he is strictly above the cut-off should yield
him a utility of at most u¯, with utility of exactly u¯ if xij > 0. Thus we require for each
i and j that i.e.
xij > 0, i j Cj(x)⇒ uij = u¯, (4)
xij = 0, i j Cj(x)⇒ uij ≤ u¯. (5)
We show that we can construct U consistent with P such that Conditions (2)-(5) hold.
For each agent i ∈ N we distinguish between four types of schools: The set M1 consists
of schools for which i is above the cut-off, the set M2 of schools for which he is in the
cut-off and receives a seat with positive probability under xi, the set M3 consists of
schools for which i is in the cut-off but does not receive a seat under xi, and the set
M4 consists of schools for which he is below the cut-off. We first choose utilities for
the first three types of schools. Afterwards, for schools in M4 utilities can be chosen
such that Ui is consistent with Pi but otherwise arbitrarily.
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If M1 6= ∅ we consider the unique school j = maxPiM1 and let uij = u¯. For
the other schools in M1 we choose uij ≤ u¯ and consistent with Pi|M1 but otherwise
arbitrarily. Note that, by ex-ante stability of x, if there is a j ∈ M1 with xij > 0,
then j = maxPiM1. Thus Conditions (4) and (5) hold. For j ∈ M2, we let uij = uj .
Note that, by ex-ante stability of x, i prefers all schools in M2 to all schools in M1
and that by Lemma 2 for j, j′ ∈ M2 with j′ Pi j we have uj′ > uj . Thus the choice of
utilities is consistent with Pi|M1∪M2 . Moreover, by construction, Condition (2) holds.
Finally for schools in M3 we have to choose uij ≤ uj and consistent with Pi|M1∪M2∪M3
to obtain Condition (3). This is possible by Lemma 2: If i prefers j ∈ M2 to some of
the schools in M1, then choosing uij = uj is consistent with Pi|M1∪M2∪M3 by Lemma 2
and uij ≤ uj holds with equality. If i prefers each school in M1 to school j ∈M2, then
we can choose any uij < minj′ uj′ ≤ uj that makes Ui consistent with Pi|M1∪M2∪M3 .
Now that we have defined U , we can show that x is constrained social welfare
efficient with respect to U and . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a
random assignment y that does not use a more lenient admission policy than x at any
school and such that ∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
uij · yij >
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
uij · xij . (6)
First we rearrange the right-hand side of the inequality. Note that by the definition of
a cut-off we have∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
uij · xij =
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Cj(x)
uij · xij +
∑
j∈M
∑
ijCj(x)
uij · xij .
By Condition (2) we have
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Cj(x)
uij · xij =
∑
j∈M
uj ·
 ∑
i∈Cj(x)
xij
 .
By Condition (4) we have
∑
j∈M
∑
ijCj(x)
uij · xij =
∑
j∈M
u¯ ·
 ∑
ijCj(x)
xij
 = ∑
j∈M
u¯ ·
qj − ∑
i∈Cj(x)
xij

= n · u¯−
∑
j∈M
u¯ ·
 ∑
i∈Cj(x)
xij
 .
In conclusion, we have
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
uij · xij =
∑
j∈M
(uj − u¯) ·
 ∑
i∈Cj(x)
xij
+ n · u¯. (7)
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Next we derive an upper for the left-hand side of Inequality (6) as follows: Since y does
not use a more lenient admission policy than x at any school, we have:∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
uij · yij =
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Cj(x)
uij · yij +
∑
j∈M
∑
ijCj(x)
uij · yij .
By Condition (3) we have
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Cj(x)
uij · yij ≤
∑
j∈M
uj ·
 ∑
i∈Cj(x)
yij
 .
By Condition (5) we have
∑
j∈M
∑
ijCj(x)
uij · yij ≤
∑
j∈M
u¯ ·
 ∑
ijCj(x)
yij
 = ∑
j∈M
u¯ ·
qj − ∑
i∈Cj(x)
yij

≤ u¯ · n−
∑
j∈M
u¯ ·
 ∑
i∈Cj(x)
yij
 .
In conclusion, we have
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
uij · yij ≤
∑
j∈M
(uj − u¯) ·
 ∑
i∈Cj(x)
yij
+ n · u¯.
Combining this inequality with Inequality (6) and Equality (7), we obtain the inequality
∑
j∈M
(uj − u¯) ·
 ∑
i∈Cj(x)
yij
 > ∑
j∈M
(uj − u¯) ·
 ∑
i∈Cj(x)
xij
 .
Since uj − u¯ > 0 for each j ∈M , there exists in particular a j ∈M with∑
i∈Cj(x)
yij >
∑
i∈Cj(x)
xij ≥ 0.
But this implies that j has a more lenient admission policy under y than x, a
contradiction. This concludes the proof that (1)⇒ (5).
Next we show (1)⇒ (4). We have to define prices p, cut-offs C and budgets b such
that (x,C, p) ∈ E(U, b,). We define the cut-off classes to be the cut-offs under x,
i.e. for each j ∈M we let Cj := Cj(x). For each j ∈M we let
pj = uj − u¯.
Defining prices in this way guarantees that the relative prices between two schools
that an agent obtains with positive probability equals the marginal rate of substitution
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of the two schools where utility is measured in excess of the utility of the “fall-back
school”:
pj
pj′
=
uj − u¯
uj′ − u¯ .
We define budgets b = (bi)i∈N by
bi =
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · xij .
We show that for each i ∈ N assignment xi is optimal given prices, cut-offs and his
budget, i.e. we want to show that xi is an optimum for the problem:
max
pi
∑
j:ijCj
uij · pij
subject to
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · pij ≤ bi,∑
j:ijCj
pij ≤ 1,
pij ≥ 0, ∀j : i j Cj .
The dual problem is
min
λ,µ
λ · bi + µ
subject to pj · λ+ µ ≥ uij , ∀j : i ∈ Cj ,
µ ≥ uij , ∀j : i j Cj ,
λ, µ ≥ 0.
The choice of λ = 1 and µ = u¯ is feasible for the dual, since, by Conditions (2) and
(3), for each j with i ∈ Cj we have
pj = uj − u¯ ≥ uij − u¯,
and since, by Conditions (4) and (5), for each j with i j Cj we have
u¯ ≥ uij .
Now by Conditions (2) and (4) we have∑
j:ijCj
uij · xij =
∑
j:i∈Cj
uj · xij + u¯ · (1−
∑
j:i∈Cj
xij) =
∑
j:i∈Cj
(uj − u¯) · xij + u¯
=
∑
j:i∈Cj
pj · xij + u¯ = bi + u¯ = bi + u¯ = λ · bi + µ.
By linear programming duality, this shows that xi is an optimal solution to the agent’s
maximization problem (and (λ = 1, µ = u¯) is optimal for the dual).
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Example 1 (cont.). We reconsider the previous Example 1 with the same preferences
and priorities as before. Consider the assignment x. One can check that the x is
constrained ordinally efficient with respect to P and . To construct a utility profile U
such that x is constrained social welfare efficient with respect to U and , we proceed
as follows: We can order the schools j1 B j4 B j2 B j5 B j3 (see Figure 1). We let
u1 = 6 > u4 = 5 > u2 = 4 > u5 = 3 > u3 = 2 > u¯ = 1.
For agent 1, school 5 is the most preferred school for which he is above the cut-off. He
prefers schools 1 and 4 to school 5 and is in the cut-off for both of them and receives
both of them with positive probability under x. Thus we let
u11 = u1 = 6 > u14 = u4 = 5 > u15 = u¯ = 1.
The other utilities may be chosen consistent with P1 but otherwise arbitrarily, e.g.
u12 =
1
2
> u13 =
1
3
.
Following the same construction for the other agents, we obtain:
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
6 6 6 13
1
2
1
2 4 4 4 1
1
3
1
2 2
1
2 2
5 13
1
2
1
3
1
3
1 1 1 3 3
We choose the cut-offs of x as cut-offs to decentralize the assignment.
C1 = C1(x) = {1, 2, 3}, C2 = C2(x) = {2, 3, 4}, C3 = C3(x) = {1, 3, 5},
C4 = C4(x) = {1, 2}, C5 = C5(x) = {4, 5}
We choose prices such that for each school j we have pj = uj − u¯. Thus
p1 = 6− 1 = 5, p2 = 4− 1 = 3, p3 = 2− 1 = 1, p4 = 5− 1 = 4, p5 = 3− 1 = 2.
Budgets are
b1 = p1 · x11 + p4 · x14 = 5 · 1
3
+ 4
1
2
= 323 ,
b2 = p1 · x1 + p2 · x2 = 5 · 1
3
+ 3 · 1
3
= 223 ,
b3 = p1 · x31 + p2 · x32 + p5 · x35 = 5 · 1
3
+ 3 · 1
6
+
1
3
= 212 ,
b4 = p2 · x42 + p5 · x45 = 3 · 1
3
+ 2 · 1
6
= 113 ,
b5 = p3 · x53 + p5 · x55 = 2
3
+ 2 · 1
6
= 1.
18
One can show that for each agent i the lottery xi is a solution to his utility maximization
problem. As an example consider agent 1. His optimization problem and the dual of
this problem are given by
max
pi=(pi1,...,pi5)
6 · pi1 + 12 · pi2 + 13 · pi3 + 5 · pi4 + pi5 minλ,µ 3
2
3 · λ+ µ
subject to 5 · pi1 + pi3 + 4pi4 ≤ 323 , subject to 5 · λ+ µ ≥ 6
pi1 + pi2 + pi3 + pi4 + pi5 ≤ 1, µ ≥ 1
2
,
pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4, pi5 ≥ 0. λ+ µ ≥ 1
3
,
4 · λ+ µ ≥ 5,
µ ≥ 1
λ, µ ≥ 0.
Choosing λ = 1, µ = 1 is feasible for the dual. Moreover
6 · x11 + 12 · x12 + 13 · x13 + 5 · x14 + x15 = 2 + 0 + 0 + 212 + 16 = 423 = 323 · λ+ µ.
By linear programming duality this demonstrates that x1 is optimal for agent 1.
3.3 The Impossibility of a Cardinal Second Welfare The-
orem
In our ordinal efficiency welfare theorem we started with ordinal preferences and con-
structed vNM-utilities, budgets, cut-offs and prices to decentralize an ex-ante stable
and constrained ordinally efficient assignment. It it a natural question, whether the
result can be strengthened in the following way: Start with a profile of vNM-utilities
and show that each constrained Pareto efficient assignment can be decentralized as a
price equilibrium. In this final section, we demonstrate by means of a counter-example
that this is not possible and a cardinal second welfare theorem does not hold under our
constrained efficiency notion. Since the validity of the first welfare theorem (Proposi-
tion 4) seems to be very dependent on the particular constrained efficiency notion that
we employ (compare Example 3), this is a strong indication that the first and second
welfare theorem cannot be obtained jointly for the same constrained efficiency notion.
Example 4. Consider four agents, four schools, each with a single seat (qj = 1 for each
j), and the following utilities and priorities.
U1 U2 U3 U4 1 2 3 4
4 2 2 4 2, 3 4 2, 3 1
3 3 3 1 1 2, 3 1, 4 4
2 4 5 2 4 1 2, 3
1 1 1 3
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The underlined entries in the priorities are the cut-offs for the following assignment
x =

3
4 0 0
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
2 0
0 12
1
2 0
0 14 0
3
4
 .
By going through all potential blocking pairs, one can check that x is ex-ante stable.
Next we show that x is constrained Pareto efficient: Suppose y Pareto dominates x and
does not use a more lenient admission policy at any school. Since y does not use a more
lenient admission policy at any school, agent 1 cannot receive a seat in school 2 or 3 and
cannot receive a higher probability for receiving a seat in school 1. Thus y1 = x1. Since
y does not use a more lenient admission policy at any school, agent 4 cannot receive
a seat in school 2 or 3 and cannot receive a higher probability for receiving a seat in
school 4. Thus y4 = x4. Thus, agents 1 and 4 receive the same assignment in x and y
and we can focus on agents 2 and 3. Moreover, the sum of probability shares allocated
to agents 2 and 3 is the same in both assignments y2 + y3 = x2 + x3 = (
1
4 ,
3
4 , 1, 0).
Since u21 = u31 = 2, u22 = u32 = 3 and u23 = 5 > 4 = u33 the only way that y could
Pareto improve upon x is that y23 > x23 and y33 < x33. But in this case agent 3 can
have an expected utility from y3 that is higher than his expected utility from x3, only
if y31 > x31 and y32 > x32. However, y31 > x31 implies that x21 > y21, contradicting
the fact that x21 = 0.
Next we show that x cannot be decentralized as an equilibrium. Suppose there are
budgets b ∈ RN+ , cut-offs C and prices p ∈ RM+ such that (x,C, p) ∈ E(U, b,). Since
x11 > 0, x21 > 0 and 2 1 1, we have 2 1 C1 and therefore p21 = 0. Since x21 >
0, x22 > 0, x23 > 0 and u23 > u22 > u21 we have 0 = p21 < p2 = p22 < p3 = p32 < ∞.
Thus agent 2’s optimization problem is
max
pi
2pi1 + 3pi2 + 4pi3
subject to pi1 + pi2 + pi3 ≤ 1
p2 · pi2 + p3 · pi3 ≤ b2
pi1, pi2, pi3 ≥ 0
for p2, p3 > 0 (since u24 < u21 and p21 = 0, we can ignore school 4 in the above
problem). Since x21, x22, x23 > 0 and x2 is an optimal solution to the problem, both
constraints bind for pi = x2. But this implies that
p2
p3
=
u22 − u21
u23 − u21 =
3− 2
4− 2 =
1
2
.
Agent 3 is in the same priority classes as 2 at all schools. Therefore he faces the same
prices as agent 2. But this implies that agent 3 can afford the lottery (14 , 0,
3
4 , 0), as
b3 ≥ p2 · x32 + p3 · x33 = p2 1
2
+ p3 · 1
2
≥ p2 · 0 + p3 · 3
4
.
But this lottery yields a higher expected utility as x2 since
2 · 14 + 5 · 34 = 174 > 4 = 3 · 12 + 5 · 12 .
This contradicts the assumption that (x,C, p) is an equilibrium.
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